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Abstract 
Rising deficits and high debt ratios characterized currency crises in countries with low 
private savings rates and low population densities. But in emerging markets with large 
population transferring to more productive employment, sustainable debts and deficits 
may be higher. Debt ratios fall with growth rates. Higher private savings can compensate 
for government dissaving. An optimizing model of such an economy with dualistic 
labour markets and two types of consumers demonstrates these features but also shows 
debt ratios tend to rise in high growth phases. Policy conclusions for fiscal consolidation 
and coordination with monetary policy are derived in the Indian context.    
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1. Introduction 
Fund managers are trained to be doubtful about an emerging market with rising fiscal 
deficits and high debts ratios. But we argue risk assessments must be context sensitive. 
The Indian government’s fiscal deficit rose sharply in 2008-09 exceeding its targeted 
value by about 4 percent, although before that the government was on target to achieve 
the steady reduction in deficits as mandated by the 2003 Fiscal Responsibility and Budget 
Management (FRBM) Act. The lapse was partly driven by oil shock subsidies, 
unbudgeted pay commission awards and poor expenditure management. But it was 
required because of large external demand shocks, and a fear cum earlier domestic 
monetary tightening led decline in demand, which reduced output much below potential.  
 
To associate high Indian deficit ratios with higher risk is to extrapolate unconditionally 
from past crises in Latin American countries where these features were found together. 
These countries had low savings rates and low population densities. In India higher 
private savings compensates for government dissaving. In this paper we show how high 
private saving reduces the current account deficit. Therefore twin deficits that provoke 
outflows become unlikely.  
 
Fiscal stimuli contributed to making India one of the brighter spots in a dismal globe. 
There were fears the government may not have the capacity to reverse rising deficits, and 
with debt ratios already at 80 percent, an unsustainable rise in debt may result. But as 
growth revived, India became one of the first countries to resume fiscal consolidation in 
2010. The second exercise in this paper shows how higher growth rates reduce debt 
ratios. In high population density emerging markets (EMs) in a catch-up phase, growth 
can be expected to rise. Examining India’s dynamic government budget constraint shows 
some decrease in debt in high growth periods. But in the post 2003 high growth phase 
this was less than feasible, despite the notification of the FRBM Act.  
 
Third, introducing the dynamic debt equation in a DSGE open economy model used for 
monetary policy helps to explain these outcomes, and to derive optimal monetary policy 
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and its interaction with fiscal policy. This approach is relevant for the analysis of EMs 
because forward looking behaviour is combined with frictions that are important for 
EMs, DSGE models’ focus on labour productivity is appropriate especially during 
transition, and allowing policy to respond to outcomes rather than follow rules is useful 
in EMs where uncertainty is more. Backwardness in technology, infrastructure and 
education reduce potential output in EMs, but it rises in transition, and the correct fiscal 
interventions can support it. Our adaptation distinguishes between two types of 
consumers and suppliers of labour. It is therefore able to capture the effects of transition 
in populous EMs as the labour share in the more productive occupations rise, and to 
model the typical shocks.  
 
In response to shocks to subsistence consumption the model throws up a large increase in 
debt. The rise is more if debt levels are already high, and if there is higher growth. This is 
the exact Indian fiscal response during the high growth period and during the financial 
crisis. Monetary accommodation reduces debt levels but can increase instability if there is 
a permanent rise in government expenditure. Higher transitional growth does reduce per 
capita debt ratios, but since the expenditure response can overwhelm it, some restrictions 
are required on expenditure.  
 
Implications for Indian macroeconomic policy, explored in the final section of the paper, 
are revamping the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) legislation to 
emphasize expenditure caps, rather than deficits, thus improving compliance incentives, 
and shifting expenditure to components that enhance the supply response. With such 
fiscal consolidation, monetary policy can safely support growth.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a contextual assessment of the 
twin deficit hypothesis, Section 3 analyses the factors affecting the evolution of 
government debt, Section 4 introduces fiscal policy in a model for optimal monetary 
policy: Section 4.1 presents the model, Section 4.2 adds government debt to it, Section 
4.3 presents the simulation results, and Section 4.4 derives monetary and fiscal policy 
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combinations, Section 5 applies the analysis to Indian government deficits, before 
Section 6 concludes. Details of the model are given in an appendix. 
 
2. Twin Deficits and private savings 
The balance of payments is the record of a country’s foreign transactions in an open 
economy. Assume, for the time being, there is no income from abroad and no 
government, then the basic macroeconomic income equal to expenditure identity is Y= 
C+I+X-M. Net exports are also the trade surplus, in this case equal to the current account 
surplus of the balance of payments, CA. Thus CA = X-M = NX. Substituting savings, S, 
for Y – C, in the basic identity, gives S – I = X-M. Thus the CA is also equal to S – I. The 
popular conception of CA is identified with the net exports of goods and services. But 
this derivation makes it clear that the CA depends on macro policies affecting S and I, not 
only on trade policies. If domestic savings exceed investment this must be reflected in 
exports exceeding imports and vice versa. If investment exceeds savings there would be a 
current account deficit: CAD = I – S = M - X = NM. 
 
On introducing government, the CAD can be derived as the excess of I over S plus the 
excess of government expenditure over taxes or the government deficit (GD). From Y-T- 
C + T-G- I = X-M, we get S = S
P 
+ T-G = I + NX or I = S
P 
+
 
S
G 
+NM. That is: 
 
CAD = I- S
P
 +GD             (1)  
 
So as government expenditure exceeds taxes, unless I falls or S
P
 rises, the CAD will 
widen. This is the twin deficits hypothesis, where one deficit is expected to lead to the 
other, so that both can be expected to occur together. But a government deficit need not 
necessarily imply positive CAD if private savings are high. 
 
S
P
 = I + CA +G-T             (2) 
 
In an open economy, private savings can be used for domestic investment, acquiring 
assets from foreigners and for buying government debt. In many Asian countries a rise in 
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income tends to raise savings more than consumption. In boom times investment may 
exceed savings but only marginally. For example, the current account deficit, which 
finances the difference between investment and domestic savings, remained around 1 
percent of GDP in India. Capital flows much larger than the current account deficit were 
accumulated as reserves. With these cushions of domestic and foreign resources 
available, temporary government dissaving is not threatening.  
 
3. Evolution of Government Debt 
The other danger from a government deficit is that it adds to government debt. We turn, 
therefore, to examine the evolution of government debt. Assume a cashless economy in 
which all government debt consists of riskless one-period nominal debt. The maturity 
value of nominal government debt is BtPt. This changes over time as follows: 
 
   tttttttt TGPPBiPB   111            (3) 
 
The maturity value of real public debt is Bt: Real government purchases are Gt and 
nominal net tax collections are Tt so that real tax collections are tt PT . The real debt 
to output ratio is bt. Dividing by Yt, and making other manipulations, (3) can be written 
as: 
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11            (4) 
 
And further using 11 1,1   tttttt PPYYg   and the approximation:  
 
     tttttt gigi   1111           (5) 
 
We get: 
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  11           (6) 
Equation (6) gives the evolution of the real debt ratio. Higher debt increases real debt as 
interest payments rise, as does the primary deficit ratio (pd) or excess of real government 
expenditure over taxation as a ratio to output. Therefore high debt levels can imply 
exploding unsustainable debt. Falling real interest rates and rising growth rates 
effectively reduce government debt. Inflation and growth rates do not affect the nominal 
value of public debt, BtPt, which increases in any year by nominal interest payments on 
debt plus the PD, PtGt - Tt. The latter is the non-interest budget deficit, while the fiscal 
deficit includes interest payments and is the total government borrowing requirement. If 
the real interest rate equals the rate of growth, the PD ratio alone would add to the debt 
ratio. 
 
4. Introducing Fiscal Policy in the SOEME Model 
So far we have considered the effects of fiscal policy on the government debt taking the 
interest and inflation rate as given. But the latter are determined by monetary policy. So 
we turn to examine (i) what are the restrictions on fiscal policy, which will allow optimal 
choice of interest rates in the context of a small open emerging market economy 
(SOEME), and (ii) if the structure of a SOEME gives greater degrees of freedom for 
policy.  
 
4.1 Optimal monetary policy SOEME model 
Optimal monetary policy has been derived in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
models with imperfect competition and nominal rigidities
1
, and is found to have 
substantial effects on real variables. Under monopolistic competition with product 
diversity individual producers have market power implying output is suboptimally low. 
This, together with some type of price stickiness, allows monetary policy to have real 
effects. This framework is promising for the analysis of EMs since the rigidities that 
dominate these markets can be introduced. Optimization over time by consumers, 
                                                 
1
 See Clarida et. al (1999) for a survey, and Clarida et. al (2001) for extension to an open economy. 
Woodford (2003) offers a rigorous treatment of the literature. 
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workers and firms can be reduced to simple aggregate demand and supply curves with 
forward-looking variables. Being derived from basic technology, preferences and market 
structure, the coefficients of the equations are robust to policy changes, thus meeting the 
Lucas critique. The policy problem then simplifies to minimization of the deviation of 
output and inflation from steady-state values subject to these curves. 
 
Goyal (2007, 2009, 2010) adapted the basic model
2
 to make it relevant to analyze 
monetary policy in EMs with a large share of less productive labour in the process of 
being absorbed into the modern sector.  The steady-state full employment assumption of 
equilibrium models is far from adequate in these markets. At the very least, two types of 
consumers and workers need to be distinguished in the SOEME—those above 
subsistence (R), and those at subsistence (P). While the first are able to smooth 
consumption using international markets, those at subsistence cannot. Their intertemporal 
elasticity of consumption, productivity and wages are lower and their labor supply 
elasticity is higher, compared to the first group. All these follow from the key 
difference—high and low productivity. The product market structure, technology and 
preferences of R type consumers are the same across all economies. Productivity shocks 
differ since EMs are in transition stages of applying the new technologies becoming 
available. P type consumers are assumed to be at a fixed subsistence wage, financed in 
part by transfers from R types, mediated by the government.  
 
The basic consumption Euler, household labor supply, risk sharing, aggregate 
equilibrium, and firms’ profit maximization is derived in the appendix following Galli 
and Monacelli (2005). Given first order conditions (FOCs), risk sharing only for the R 
type, exogenous subsistence level consumption of the P type, and the aggregate demand 
supply equality across countries, each of measure unity, the terms of trade, St, are solved 
in terms of endogenous output, Yt, and exogenous variables, world output, Yt* and the 
consumption of the P type, CP, t. Substituting out the terms of trade, and taking deviations 
of output from the natural output, yt - ty = xt, to write the FOCs as functions of log 
                                                 
2
 The basic Gali and Monacelli (2005) (henceforth GM) SOE model is adapted to a SOEME by 
differentiating between the R and P types. Goyal (2007) offers a systematic comparison of results for a 
SOEME contrasted with a SOE. 
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output gap, xt, and domestic inflation, πH, then gives the final form of the two aggregate 
supply (AS) and aggregate demand (AD) equations. The level where marginal cost is at 
its desired steady-state level defines the natural output ty . Low productivity, poor 
infrastructure and other distortions keep the natural output in the SOEME below world 
levels and convergence to world levels is part of the process of development.  
 
The intertemporal elasticity of consumption is (1/σi), labour supply elasticity (1/i) with 
the subscript indicating the R or P type respectively; without the subscript it is the 
aggregate value. The population share of R is η, 0< η <1. The share of foreign goods, α, 
0< α<1. The discount factor is β, so that 11    is the time discount rate; it is the 
riskless nominal interest rate; 1 ttt pp  is CPI (consumer price index) inflation 
(where pt  log Pt); productivity is ta . It is easy to derive ttHt s  , , where st = 
pF,t – pH, t is the log effective terms of trade or price of foreign goods in terms of domestic 
goods. These identities allow transformation of consumer to domestic price inflation and 
vice versa. Consumer prices, which enter the consumer’s maximand, have to be 
converted into producer or domestic prices. Lower case letters are logs of the respective 
variables. 
  
The quadratic loss function (7) of the central bank (CB) is a weighted average of 
inflation, output and interest rate deviations from equilibrium values:  
 
222 iqqxqL iY              (7) 
 
The last is a smoothing term that prevents large changes in the policy rate. The CB 
minimizes this subject to the AD (8), AS (9) and the law of motion for real public debt 
(10). The last is derived in Section 4.2. Dynamic impulse responses to cost, natural rate, 
and government expenditure shocks, generated from the optimization, are presented in 
Section 4.3.  
  
The dynamic AD equation for the SOEME is: 
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        ttHtt
D
ttt rrEixEx   1,1
1


          (8) 
Where       }{}{11 * 11,   ttDtPtDtaDt yEcEarr   
and       , 
 

D
d
1
, 
 





D
1
,  dD  ,   
       Dd   1 ,   11  RR    
 
The dynamic AS and the change in public debt respectively are: 
  111   bft,HbtDt,Htft,H xE          (9) 
     ttgttbt iˆbGˆgbbbˆbˆ   11 11       (10) 
 
The natural interest rate, ρ, is defined as the equilibrium real rate, consistent with a zero 
or target rate of inflation, when prices are fully flexible. Shocks that change the natural 
rate open an output gap and affect inflation. The shock or exogenous term trr  that enters 
the AD is therefore the percentage deviation of the natural rate from its steady-state 
value. The deviation occurs due to real disturbances that change natural output; trr  rises 
for any temporary demand shock and falls for any temporary supply shock. Optimal 
policy requires insulating the output gap from these shocks, so that the CB’s interest rate 
instrument should move in step with the natural rate. Thus the CB would accommodate 
positive supply shocks that raise the natural output by lowering interest rates. It would 
offset positive demand shocks that raise output about its potential by raising interest rates. 
In a SOEME a reduction in cP is an additional large shock requiring reduction in the 
policy rate, since it increases the distance from the world consumption level (see Goyal 
2009). 
 
The dynamic AS derived in the appendix is: 
     tDtHttH xE   1,,           (11) 
Since empirical estimations and the dominance of administered pricing in SOEMEs 
suggest that past inflation affects current inflation, the modification of the AS (9) was 
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used in the simulations, with b as the share of lagged and f the share of forward-looking 
inflation. 
 
The slope of the AS for a SOEME is    DD , compared to λ ( + ) for a closed 
economy and λ (α + ) for a SOE, where 
  




1
R , 
  




1
R
D , 


 R . Since R in the SOEME are identical to the representative SOE consumer, R is 
the numerator of α and D. The slope is reduced in an open compared to a closed 
economy since  > D > α, but the slope can be higher in the SOEME compared to a 
SOE, even though  is lower for the SOEME, since D > α. While α =1 if R =1, D 
always exceeds unity if α <1.  The inequalities follow from the parameter values. In 
particular  < 1 reduces the denominator of D and . Similar results hold for the more 
general case of R  1. Since the gap between is large and varies with  and α, the slope 
for the SOEME remains larger than in the SOE. 
 
Since D > α, the output gap, just like output, is less responsive to the excess of the 
policy rate over the natural interest rate in the SOEME compared to the SOE, while 
shocks to subsistence consumption, cP, are a new source of shocks tending to reduce the 
natural rate below  in a SOEME. From (8), if the policy rate exceeds the natural interest 
rate, AD would fall.  
 
As  approaches unity, or all the population reaches higher consumption levels, it implies 
the economy has developed, the cP term disappears and the equations collapse to those of 
the SOE. 
 
4.2. Government debt 
Next we derive the equation for the response of government debt to a shock that could 
include change in fiscal policy. Since we are interested in local equilibrium determination 
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it is sufficient to consider fiscal rules that are nearly consistent with a steady state
3
. In a 
steady state with zero inflation and real disturbances both Bt and real tax collections 
tt
PT are equal to values 0, B , and 0,0  GGYY
tt
, growing at a steady-
state growth g, and 01
1


ii
t
. For consistency with the evolution of nominal 
debt (3), steady-state fiscal values must satisfy  BG   1 .  
 
To analyze the existence of equilibria near this steady state (3) can be linearized around 
the steady-state values, getting: 
     tttttt ibGgbbbb ˆˆˆˆˆ 11   
    (12) 
 
Where     YYBBb tttt   ˆ,ˆ  and  YGGG tt ˆ , iii tt ˆ and YBb  . 
The term in steady-state growth g in equation (12) comes from following a process 
similar to the derivation of (6) from (4), by assuming a steady-state rate of growth g of 
natural output ty so that 1 tt yy . Such a growth is to be expected for an emerging 
market in the process of converging to world output levels.  
 
Woodford (2003, pp.312) defines a fiscal or tax rule as locally Ricardian if on 
substituting into the flow budget constraint (6) or its local version (12) ―it implies that 
{bt} remains forever within a bounded neighborhood of B , for all paths of the 
endogenous variables {t, Yt, it} that remain forever within some sufficiently small 
neighborhoods of the steady-state values  iY ,,0 , and all small enough values of the 
exogenous disturbances (including 
t
Gˆ )‖ 
 
Under these circumstances the monetary policy rule and the outcomes of equilibrium 
inflation, output and interest rates do not depend on the paths of either of the purely fiscal 
variables {Bt, t} as they cancel out in the individual’s budget constraint. The fiscal 
policy rule can be neglected if it is Ricardian in this sense.  
                                                 
3
 The treatment in this section follows Woodford (2003), Chapter 4, Section 4. 
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Suppose a linear approximation to the tax rule is of the form: 
 
     tgtbt Gb
ˆˆˆ
1                    (13) 
 
Where  b and g are the respective response coefficients of taxes to deviations in debt 
ratio and in government expenditure. Substituting this into (12) gives the required law of 
motion for real government debt (10). The latter is stable or the tax rule (13) is locally 
Ricardian if and only if: 
 
  111  b      (14) 
 
If 1b , then fiscal policy or the tax rule is locally Ricardian if and only if  1b . 
Defining equilibrium ―to be (locally) determinate if and only if there are unique bounded 
equilibrium processes for all of the endogenous variables {bt, t, Yt, it} for sufficiently 
tightly bounded processes for the exogenous disturbances (pp. 314)‖, Woodford (2003) 
shows that if fiscal policy is locally Ricardian, equilibrium is determinate if and only if 
the response of monetary policy to inflation exceeds unity. The AD, AS system is stable 
with the latter condition. The three equation systems with debt require the additional 
stability condition (14). If fiscal policy is locally non-Ricardian, bounded paths for the 
endogenous variables will require monetary policy to violate the Taylor Principle and 
moderate its response to inflation. So unsustainable borrowing will require monetary 
accommodation.  
 
Woodford, following earlier literature (see, for example, Davig and Leeper, 2009), then 
distinguishes between active and passive fiscal and monetary policies. If fiscal policy is 
Ricardian (passive) monetary policy can be active. If, however, fiscal policy is non-
Ricardian (active) monetary policy must become passive (accommodating) to prevent 
instability. We explore some combinations of monetary and fiscal policy for an EM 
through simulations below.   
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4.3. Simulations 
Calibration was loosely based on Indian stylized facts
4
. The baseline coefficients are 
given in Table 1. The natural output y t is optimally equivalent to a flexible price 
equilibrium, if a subsidy is set so as to correct for market power, openness and other 
distortions. This is calibrated for emerging markets in Goyal (2009) but is not required in 
the current simulations. The price setting parameters are such that prices adjust in an 
average of one year ( =0.75), giving  = 0.24. The price response to output, , is set at 
0.25, which implies an average labour supply elasticity of 4. Because of less than 
perfectly flexible interest rates, lagged interest rate also enter the AD with a weight of 
0.2. 
 
Place Table 1 here 
 
Since R = 1 and 1/P=0, the implied average intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 
(1-) + =0.58; = 0.99 implies a riskless annual steady-state return of 4 percent; and 
so the natural interest rate  = -1-1=0.01. Consumption of the mature economy and of 
the rich is normalized at unity, five times that of the poor, so CP = 0.2. Given , this gives 
consistent C values of 0.75, K (a measure of deviation from world output) of 1.1 so that 
cP =  -1.6 and ĸ=0.1. Initial conditions are normalized at unity so the log value is zero. 
The  and  parameters are calibrated to reflect the Indian unit benchmark and 
population share and export plus import share respectively. 
 
A negative interest rate effect on consumption requires an intertemporal elasticity large 
enough so that the substitution effect is higher than the positive income effect of higher 
interest rates on net savers. Empirical studies have found real interest rates to have weak 
effects on consumption. Especially in low-income countries, subsistence considerations 
are stronger than intertemporal factors. This is particularly so when the share of food in 
                                                 
4
 The model was solved in state-space form by modifying Soderlind’s (2000) Matlab algorithms available 
at http://home.tiscalinet.ch/paulsoderlind.Modified versions used in SOEME 
simulations are available at igidr.ac.in/~ashima. 
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total expenditure is large. The elasticity Ogaki, Ostry and Reinhart (1996) estimate in a 
large cross-country study, varies from 0.05 for Uganda and Ethiopia to a high of 0.6 for 
Venezuela and Singapore.  Our average elasticity of 0.58 compares well with these 
figures.  
 
The weight on inflation in the CB’s loss function q , exceeding unity satisfies the Taylor 
principle. The fiscal variables follow average Indian ratios: b is taken as 0.15 the average 
ratio of tax revenues to nominal debt in 2009; g , is set at zero; b is 0.8, and g is 0.006 
for each simulation period since the annual rate of growth lie between 7 to 9 percent and 
the simulations are at the monthly frequency. 
 
Cost shocks are frequent in SOEMEs; shocks to subsistence consumption imply a large 
shock to the natural rate, and populist pressures affect government expenditure, Gˆ . 
Therefore the exogenous driving forces simulated are period one calibrated 0.2 standard 
deviation cost shock to domestic inflation, 0.01 negative shock to the natural rate, and 0.1 
standard deviation shock to government expenditure. Each shock is of the same generic 
form. For example, persistence of the Gˆ  shock can be estimated from Gtt
G
t GˆGˆ  1 . 
   
Table 2 reports some of the simulations. The benchmark simulations give consumer 
inflation, output gap, domestic inflation, debt (all as deviations from the steady-state) and 
the policy rate volatilities for each of the shocks. The initial values of tbˆ and it are also 
reported. Figures 1 and 2 show the response of each of these variables to the cost and 
natural rate shock respectively over the 12 periods of the simulation. The table also 
reports sensitivity analysis with changes in the fiscal parameters and the weights of the 
CB’s loss function. Figures 3, and 4 show the response of tbˆ to the variation in each of 
the parameters for the cost and natural rate shock respectively. Figure 5 gives the 
response of tbˆ  to Gˆ  shocks of varying persistence. 
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Place Table 2 and Figures 1-5 here 
 
There are interesting insights from the simulations. The inflation following the cost shock 
leads to a fall in tbˆ , but it returns to its steady state value in 4 periods. If natural rates fall 
tbˆ rises sharply, as the government borrows against the rise in potential output due to a 
positive supply shock, or spends to maintain demand due to a negative demand shock, or 
compensates for a fall in cP. These are the factors that reduce natural rates. This fiscal 
response dominates the reduction in bˆ  due to the fall in interest rates, from equation (10). 
The net effect is from the working of the system as a whole. Since the policy rate falls 
less than the natural rate, the output gap rises, explaining some of the adjustments. 
Convergence back to the steady state is slow, not fully completed in the 12 periods.  
 
Sensitivity analysis for both types of shocks is similar. A fall in b reduces the deviation 
from steady state, since adjustment back would be more difficult. If b is lower, current 
borrowing requirement is reduced, and tbˆ rises less. A change in g is the only one to have 
different effects under the 2 types of shocks. Under a cost shock, higher growth reduces 
the deviation of debt but for a natural rate shock it increases it. A shock to the 
consumption of the poor induces the government to borrow more if growth is high, but 
the reduction in the debt ratio under higher growth dominates under a cost shock.  
 
In accordance with Woodford’s theoretical result, equilibrium does not exist if q <1, but 
under both shocks, if q =1.1 instead of 2, policy rates are lower. This monetary 
accommodation reduces the change in debt but increases deviations in the other 
macroeconomic variables. Table 2 reports a simulation where all the weights in the CB’s 
loss function are reduced to 0.5 and b is put at zero. Equilibrium is determinate. The 
macroeconomic adjustment is of a similar order of magnitude as the case with q =1.1 as 
the only change, but the fall in b  reduces the debt deviation as earlier. If the only change 
from benchmark shock is b = 0, equilibrium is determinate, the other macroeconomic 
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variables are the same as in the benchmark shock, only the deviation in debt is 
considerably reduced.  
 
Considering a calibrated 0.01 shock to Gˆ of persistence 0.25 the only effect is a temporary 
fall in debt. But equilibrium is indeterminate if persistence exceeds 0.9. With persistence 
of 0.85 equilibrium becomes determinate but unstable. Equilibrium is indeterminate if 
q <1, determinate but even more unstable, for other macroeconomic variables, than the 
benchmark Gˆ shock, if q =1.1. The volatility of other macroeconomic variables is 
reduced if b = 0 since the initial rise in debt is considerably reduced, but tbˆ continues to 
be unstable remaining far from steady-state values at the end of 12 periods.  As in 
simulations with earlier variants of SOEME models (Goyal 2007), a rise in the share of 
the rich and in openness reduces initial interest and therefore debt response, for both 
types of shocks, implying greater debt volatility is to be expected in a poorer less globally 
integrated country
5
.  
 
4.4. Monetary-Fiscal Policy Combination 
Much more work needs to be done to explore the regions of determinacy and instability 
as a function of the parameters. The response to other types of shocks can also be 
explored. Results will change if debt or wealth enters the AD equation, and if the weights 
in the CB’s loss function are optimally derived accounting for public debt. Annicchiarico 
et. al. (2008) find the region of determinacy rises in an overlapping generation model 
with wealth effects, raising the scope for active monetary policy. Wealth effects through 
the balance of payments are an important contributor to persistent effects of monetary 
shocks in an open economy, but in a low per capita income economy taxes can be 
expected to neutralize wealth in order to smooth consumption of the P-type. Gali et. al. 
(2007) introduce rule-of-thumb consumers. Since fiscal expenditure raises rule-of-thumb 
consumption a stronger monetary response is required. But in our model, although the P-
type are not forward looking, their consumption is fixed at subsistence, and subject to 
greater rigidities in an EME, so that the neutralization of a fiscal stimuli through expected 
                                                 
5
 Simulations not reported available on request. 
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future taxes continues to be a valid first approximation.  An EME typically has a large 
debt yet since it is in a transitional catch up phase, the borders between active and passive 
fiscal and monetary policy can differ, as we find. Net household exposure to stocks and 
bonds is low and can be expected to rise even as the denominator rises with growth. 
Davig and Leeper (2009) explore the consequences of the fiscal stimuli in a DSGE model 
with markov switching between different monetary and fiscal policies. More complex 
models will yield more insights but the key contribution of consumption shocks and 
growth in emerging markets will remain.  
  
The lessons from the current simulations for the conduct and coordination of monetary 
and fiscal policy in an emerging market are: First, under an optimization respecting the 
law of motion of public debt, debt should optimally rise in response to a shock to 
subsistence consumption, and the rise will be higher the higher is debt, and the higher is 
growth, but should be moderated if the tax response to a rise in debt is low. Second, 
higher growth moderates debt volatility under cost shocks. Third, monetary 
accommodation is useful to moderate the debt response under shocks but is dangerous if 
the shock is a persistent rise in government expenditure.    
 
5. Indian Macroeconomic Policy Options 
In this section we apply insights from the analysis to Indian policy dilemmas. Despite 
high growth over 2003-08 and the adoption of an FRBM Act, Indian debt levels did not 
come down much. And despite low fiscal space the government gave large fiscal boosts 
over 2008-10 after the global financial crisis. Does this imply an unsustainable fiscal 
path? 
 
According to the analysis in the first section, high private savings, with a savings to GDP 
ratio exceeding 30, reduce the probability of a CAD and BOP crisis. Growth rates 
continued to be relatively high compared to most countries in the world, so capital 
inflows resumed quickly even in the period after the collapse of Lehman. Even as 
aggregate flows reduced, India got a higher share. 
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Next we turn to analysis of the evolution of Indian public debt, following the second 
section. Figure 6 shows the percentage change in b. It also shows the two components of 
the change in debt from Equation (6), over the Indian post-reform period. The nominal 
interest rate calculated is the implicit rate the central government pays on its debt. It is 
obtained by dividing actual interest payments in the budget documents iPB by PB. The 
latter is also obtained from the budget documents
6
. Inflation calculated from the GDP 
deflator is subtracted from i, in order to get the real rate r. The growth rate used is the 
growth of real domestic product at market prices. Finally calculated bt-1(rt - gt) and actual 
reported pd are graphed.  
 
Figure 7 shows that r was normally less than g over this period and since the negative bt-
1(rt - gt) value was larger in absolute value than a mostly positive pd, b should have fallen 
much more than it did. The discrepancy is particularly acute in the high growth period 
after 2003, since the pd was also falling over this period. Given the fall in b that should 
have occurred due to r and g, actual b did not fall; implying deficits must have been 
higher. Reported deficits may have been doctored, to satisfy the FRBM Act
7
 targets 
applicable in this period. Government debt increased through off balance sheet items that 
were not included in deficits. Cash balances were also used to break the link between 
debt and deficits.    
 
Figure 7 shows the movements in the relevant rates over the period. Although nominal 
interest rates were higher in the earlier years the consistent fall in inflation rates over the 
period meant the real interest rates on government debt rose from early strongly negative 
rates, to peak at 5 percent in 2000-01 before beginning to fall as nominal rates also fell. 
                                                 
6
 Data for the period 1990-91 to 2008-09 is graphed. Calculations, available on request, were made from 
data available from ministry of finance and RBI websites. Debt and deficit figures are for the Central 
Government.    
7
 This was enacted by Parliament in 2003. The Rules accompanying the FRBM Act required the Centre to 
reduce the fiscal deficit to 3 per cent of GDP and, eliminate revenue deficit by March 31, 2008. There was 
also a ceiling on guarantees. But the ceilings may be exceeded during "national security or national 
calamity or such other exceptional grounds as the Central Government may specify", so that the 
Government can legislate itself out of the commitments. In addition the budget has to each year place 
before Parliament the Medium Term Fiscal Policy, and Fiscal Policy Strategy and Macroeconomic 
Framework statements. Deficit financing or money creation is banned, but there are no restrictions on 
OMOs. Any deviations from the FRBM Act require the permission of Parliament. 
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Since real rates were low in both the high growth phases, r-g was strongly negative 
during these phases. The reported pd was also lower in high growth periods. In the 
second period revenues were high—the tax GDP ratio peaked at 11.5 percent. But the fall 
in b was larger in the briefer high growth period of the mid-nineties.  
 
Place Figures 6, 7 here 
 
For the first time pd turned into a surplus in 2004-05, but it had increased to 2.6 in 2008-
09, the year of the global financial crisis, and exceeded 3 the next year. For the debt ratio 
to stay unchanged at around 0.8, at such a PD ratio, the growth rate must exceed the real 
interest rate by 3.75 basis points. With a PD ratio of 3, r = 4, g = 7, our formula implies 
that in the steady-state when b is not changing, b = PD/g-r = 100 percent. Unless growth 
revives and the pd is reduced India’s steady-state debt will rise. If the reverse happens 
debt can explode. Since even high growth together with the FRBM Act was insufficient 
to reduce India’s debt, a better conceived FRBM that improves incentives for compliance 
is required.   
  
Growth did reduce debt levels, but large expenditures to increase the consumption of the 
poor, cP, given the government’s goal of inclusive growth, seem to have moderated 
deficit reduction in the second high growth period. The global shock also reduced 
employment and cP. In the SOEME model this constitutes a negative natural rate shock. 
The simulations suggest debt levels can be expected to rise, and they will be higher the 
higher is growth and the level of b. Monetary accommodation can help reduce b to the 
extent soft commodity prices reduce inflation and the rise in G is temporary. It is very 
important that there is no permanent rise in G in excess of taxing capacity, or instability 
results. The excise cuts given as part of the post-crisis fiscal stimuli would be reversed 
and the 6
th
 Pay Commission arrears and farm loan waivers were one-time payments. But 
new recurring expenditure commitments must be made only on a secure tax base. 
 
A distinction should be made between structural and cyclical deficits. With private 
demand slowing, a cyclical deficit is needed. A structural deficit may also be defended in 
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a transitional high growth period, since growth reduces debt ratios, but only if it creates 
supply-side capacity to enable growth. The level of debt and deficits should be reduced in 
good times in order to create space for countercyclical fiscal policy. The inability to bring 
down debt levels in the high growth period suggests that other measures are required to 
ensure medium-term fiscal consolidation. We discuss these in order of importance.  
 
The FRBM Act, brought down only reported deficits, which were on track to meet 
announced targets before the oil shock hit. But the episode exposed the inadequate 
attention paid to incentives and escape clauses in formulating the Act. Loopholes were 
found to maintain the letter of the law even while violating its spirit. Off budget liabilities 
such as oil bonds were used to subsidize some petroleum products. Targets were 
mechanically achieved, compressing essential expenditure on infrastructure, health and 
education, while maintaining populist subsidies. The Act should be reframed to improve 
incentives for compliance. Expenditure caps that bite especially on transfers, while 
protecting productive expenditure, will create automatic counter-cyclical stabilization as 
tax revenue falls and deficits rise in a slowdown. They will also moderate the temptation 
to raise expenditure when actual or potential revenues rise. In the Indian context, detailed 
expenditure targets are required for individual ministries, and levels of government, as 
part of improved accounting, including shifts from cash to accrual based accounts. 
 
Productive expenditure is anything that improves human, social, and physical capital, and 
therefore the supply response. Change in the composition of government expenditure 
towards this will bring down debt ratios, by increasing the denominator of the ratio, and 
raising revenues. Essential transfers must be better targeted to reduce waste, and the 
effectiveness of government expenditure improved.  Any permanent rise in G must be 
linked to a specific tax source. 
 
A more credible FRBM will allow better fiscal-monetary coordination. It will make 
monetary accommodation during the crisis period safe. To use Woodford’s terminology, 
a passive monetary policy can accompany an active fiscal policy during the crisis, as long 
as they switch positions in the longer term. The more usual combination in post-reform 
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India, as the RBI gained greater independence, was for both to be active, which harmed 
growth, as monetary tightening sought to compensate for fiscal giveaways. When Indian 
interest rates fell after 2000, despite high government deficits, and aggressive 
sterilization, because international interest rates fell, growth was stimulated.  
 
In the post-crisis circumstances, despite high government borrowing due to fiscal stimuli, 
lower inflows gave the RBI leeway to increase the share of government securities in the 
monetary base. This helped finance the deficit and limited crowding out as private 
borrowing revived. In addition to cuts in policy rates, quantitative easing with OMOs 
through the term structure was available to ease pressure on interest rates.  
 
If the composition of fiscal expenditure changes, longer-term monetary policies can also 
be recast to support growth, and further boost the diversified sources that sustain Indian 
growth. These include domestic demand, agriculture, openness, technology, the 
demographic profile, the infrastructure cycle, and having crossed a critical threshold. As 
a net commodity importer India gains from lower global prices. Dependence on external 
demand is low compared to other Asian countries. So is the dependence on foreign 
capital. But although aggregate savings are high, about half of household savings are in 
physical form, making it difficult to finance high government and reviving private 
borrowing. Requirements of infrastructure finance may force development of the 
corporate bond market. RBI backing of credit to SMEs could better intermediate savings 
and raise India’s low credit/GDP ratio.  
 
Lower tax response has a disciplining effect on debt expansion. But more efficient 
systems of tax collection will decrease debt if a more effective FRBM Act restrains the 
government. India does have improved technology-based tax systems, independent of 
government, that have delivered, and more improvements such as GST are on the way. 
There has been steady lowering of tax rates. Technology has been used to broaden 
coverage, and reduce loopholes. The experience with the destination based State level 
VAT since 2005 has been good.  The proposed move to GST in 2011 should yield the 
large efficiency gains of one market. Continuing growth may protect some of the recent 
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buoyancy in tax revenue but revenue expansion due to improved compliance and broad 
basing can be expected to survive a slowdown. Indian fiscal policy made considerable 
progress in tax reform, but improvements in expenditure management are yet to come. 
Even so there was a steady increase in the quality of Indian institutions. The 13
th
 Finance 
commission, whose report was put in the public domain in 2010, was asked to reset the 
path of fiscal consolidation. It tried to shift the composition of government expenditure 
more towards capital by imposing stricter reduction for the revenue deficit, and to make 
space for counter cyclical fiscal policy by imposing a long-term ceiling on the debt ratio. 
But for the central government at least incentives to improve compliance are still largely 
missing.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Rising fiscal deficits in the context of high debt ratios are a risk factor for any country 
especially with an open capital account. But two possible risk-mitigating factors are: high 
private savings, a large population transiting to higher productivity in a catch-up phase of 
higher growth. Higher private savings can compensate for government dissaving so that a 
fiscal deficit need not imply a balance of payment deficit. The second factor implies 
sustainable debts and deficits may be higher as growth rises. Analysis of twin deficits 
demonstrates the first and of the evolution of government debt shows how debt ratios fall 
with growth rates.  
 
But an optimizing macroeconomic policy model of a small open emerging market 
economy (SOEME) with dualistic labour markets and two types of consumers, and the 
growth dividend built into the evolution of government debt, shows debt ratios tend to be 
higher in high growth phases. An application of the analysis to and assessment of post 
reform Indian debt and deficit ratios does show less than warranted reduction in debt 
ratios in the high growth phases. The implication is that stronger legislative restraints to 
ensure countercyclical deficits would allow better fiscal and monetary coordination and 
outcomes. 
 
 23 
Even so, because of improvements in tax collection, and trends in growth and real interest 
rates, and the push for fiscal consolidation, Indian debt ratios are unlikely to become 
unsustainable, despite the fiscal stimulus after the global crisis. Just as Indian savings 
rates are rising to Chinese levels, Indian fiscal health can also approach Chinese levels if 
growth is sustained. Chinese government debt and deficits had peaked in the years of 
their big infrastructure push starting in the late nineties, but debt began to come down 
after 2005. China, as another populous emerging market, benefited from policies that 
harvested the growth dividend on deficits and debt. Improvements in fiscal institutions 
can, however, increase the dividend. 
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Appendix: Deriving AD and AS from the SOEME model  
 
Consumers and workers 
A typical SOEME has two representative households: above subsistence (R) and at 
subsistence (P). The intertemporal elasticity of consumption (1/σR), productivity and 
wages (WR) of R are higher, their labour supply elasticity (1/R) is lower compared to the 
P, and they are able to fully diversify risk in international capital markets. Each type 
seeks to maximize the discounted present value of utility—a positive function of 
consumption and a negative function of labor supplied: 
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E     i = R, P                (A1) 
Ni, t denotes hours of labor supplied by each type. Aggregate consumption Ct is a 
composite index of consumption of home (H) and foreign goods (F). Elasticity of 
substitution between H and F goods is assumed to equal unity. In this case the CES 
aggregation simplifies to (A2) for consumption and (A3) for the price index. Each of CH, 
t, CF, t are indices of a continuum of differentiated home and foreign goods respectively 
with elasticity of substitution between goods of different varieties, ε >1, as is required for 
equilibrium under monopolistic competition. Simplifications are made to reduce the 
degree of disaggregation, and focus on disaggregation of consumption between the R and 
the P households.  
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The corresponding consumer price index can be derived from cost minimization of the 
consumption bundle as is standard in the literature. The share of foreign goods, α, 0< 
α<1, defines the degree of openness. It is inversely related to the degree of home bias, 
and is assumed to be the same for R and P, since although P spend more on food, 
agricultural products are also traded goods. 
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Consumption of each type of good is a weighted average of consumption by the R and 
the P households, with η as the share of R.  
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Aggregate consumption Ct is distributed between R and P in the same proportion η, 
where η is the share of above subsistence households in consumption. Substituting for Ci,t 
from (2) above and taking out the common constant k gives (3): 
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The corresponding consumer price index can be derived from cost minimization of the 
consumption bundle as is standard in the literature. Given the constant 
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the price index can be written as: 
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           (A4) 
Since the effective terms of trade, or price of foreign goods in terms of home goods, is 
tHtFt PPS ,, , substituting in (A4) gives: 

ttHt SPP ,           (A5) 
That is, consumer prices depend on domestic prices and the terms of trade.  
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A household’s period utility function is given the specific form: 
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The constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function is defined for σ greater than 
zero and not equal to unity. At σ equal to unity it becomes ln C. Utility is maximized 
subject to a sequence of period budget constraints: 
  tititititittttit TNWDDQECP ,,,,1,1,,          (A7) 
Where Wi, t is the nominal wage paid to each type, Qt, t+1 is the stochastic discount factor 
corresponding to the random payoff Dt+1 of the portfolio purchased at t; It is the gross 
nominal yield on a riskless one period discount bond, paying one unit of domestic 
currency in t+1, so that  1,1   tttt QEI  is the price of the discounted bond; Ti, t is lump 
sum taxes or transfers. Taxes TR, t from R partly finance transfers TP, t to P; since the latter 
have zero savings DP is zero. CP must equal wages plus transfers. The government 
intermediates these transfers and runs a balanced budget so that η TR, t + A t =  -(1-η) TP, t 
where a negative tax is a transfer. A t is government revenue from its international assets, 
net of any cost of accumulating foreign exchange reserves. The subsidy is calculated to 
give P subsistence consumption C*P if they work eight hours daily, but they are free to 
increase their consumption by working longer hours. On adding up across agents the 
fiscal variables drop out and do not affect individual decisions (Woodford, 2003). Lump 
sum transfers do not enter optimizing first order conditions. The economy is assumed to 
be cashless so monetary policy works by changing interest rates. 
 
Capital markets are complete, but only the R-type of consumers can participate in them. 
Since P lack the ability to smooth consumption their intertemporal elasticity of 
consumption approaches zero. The aggregate intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1/σ, 
and the inverse of the labour supply elasticity, , are weighted sums with population 
shares of R and P as weights, 
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Since σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, an intertemporal elasticity of 
consumption approaching zero implies risk aversion approaching infinity for the poor. 
 
The standard first order conditions for optimal allocation of consumption across home 
and foreign goods yield the demand functions: 
  tttHtH CPCP  1,,           (A9) 
tttFtF CPCP ,,         (A10) 
And from intertemporal optimization, we get the consumption Euler equation: 
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Or: 
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The ith household’s labour supply is given by: 
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Since CP is subsidized to prevent it falling below subsistence C*P, we must have TP, t =  
C*P, t –N*P, t (WP, t /P t), but we assume CP, t > C*P, t since NP, t >N*P, t. That is, the poor 
work above 8 hours daily (N*) to raise their consumption above subsistence. Equations 
(A12) and (A13) can be written in log linear form as: 
tiitiitti ncpw ,,,          (A14) 
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Although cP is exogenously given it can rise with a rise in subsistence levels. Lower case 
letters are logs of the respective variables. 
 
Risk sharing  
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Equating consumption Euler equations for the R consumer in the SOEME and consumers 
in a mature economy denoted by superscript i, integrating over all i to get average world 
consumption C*, using it and the definition of the real exchange rate Z, risk sharing 
gives: 
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       (A16)  
Which can also be written as: 
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Equilibrium and terms of trade 
The aggregate demand equal to supply equality implies for the EM: 
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Where   11  RR  , ĸ = log K, K = (1- + KR), and CR, t = KR Ct and for 
world output: 
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To solve for St in terms of endogenous Yt and exogenous variables, first substitute CR, t 
and CP, t for Ct in the aggregate demand equal to supply equation and then substitute out 
CR, t using risk smoothing. This gives: 
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The terms of trade depreciate with a rise in Yt and appreciate with a rise in Yt*; but in a 
SOEME the former’s effect is magnified. CP, t also affects St, reducing the impact of Yt*.  
The multiplier factor D, which affects only the SOEME, is large because the elasticity of 
substitution is lower for a SOEME. If  R =1, then  =1, and if 1/P = 0, then  = R/. It 
also follows that D <.  Both rise as η falls or the proportion of P with low intertemporal 
elasticity of consumption (1/P = 0) rises. While η affects , both η and α affect D. As α 
falls D rises, and as α approaches 0, or the economy becomes closed, D equals , which 
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is its upper bound. In a fully open economy α approaches unity, and D falls to its lower 
bound, which is unity. 
  
Firms 
Technology: A typical firm has a log-linear production technology, derived by 
aggregation over the individual firms producing the j differentiated goods. It is written in 
log terms as:  
ttt nay         (A21) 
Where 

tR
N
tP
N
t
N
,
1
,

  aggregates over the two types of labor in the economy and 
productivity ta   log At follows an AR (A1) process: 
a
tt
a
t aa  1        (A22) 
Price setting: The real marginal cost in domestic prices, mct, is common across firms, as 
labor is mobile at the prevailing factor prices: 
))(1()( ,,,, tHtPtHtRtt pwpwamc      (A23) 
Where mct is the sum of real wages in terms of domestic prices paid to R and to P minus 
the aggregate productivity shock and    1log  where τ can be understood as an 
employment subsidy paid to firms to counter market power, and other distortions due to 
terms of trade and the labor market, thus increasing their employment level to the optimal 
flexible price level. Adding and subtracting pt (A23) becomes: 
      ttHtttPttRt apppwpwmc  ,,, )1(     (A24) 
Substituting from the consumers’ optimizing labour-leisure decision (A14), and from the 
log version of (A4) for the terms of trade: 
 
tttPPtPPtRRtRRt asncncmc   ))(1()( ,,,,  (A25)           
Thus st affects marginal cost since foreign prices affect domestic prices and costs. Using 
the identities (A8) and (A26) below, 
 
  ttPtR
ttPtR
nnn
ccc


,,
,,
1
1


       (A26) 
mct can be written as: 
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ttttt asncmc        (A27) 
Using risk sharing to eliminate cR,t, the production function (A21) to eliminate n, and the 
approximation1/P = 0, so  = R /, the marginal cost can be written as a function of 
domestic output, co, and terms relating to the external sector. 
    tttPttt sacyymc   11 ,
*                            (A28) 
The equivalent relationship for a mature economy (GM (2005)) is:  
  ttttt asyymc   1
*
                                      (A29) 
Given marginal cost, prices are set according to the Calvo staggered pricing model, 
where each firm resets price with probability (1- ) each period implying that a measure 
(1 - ) of randomly selected firms reset prices each period. Then the dynamics of 
domestic inflation are given by: 
      ttHttH cmE ˆ1,,          (A30) 
 
Where 
  





11
, mcmccm tt ˆ or the deviation of log marginal cost from its 
steady-state log value mc = -, determined by the elasticity of demand. The deviation of 
marginal cost from its steady-state value in terms of the output gap can be derived to be: 
  tDt xcm  ˆ  
Substituting in (A30) gives the AS equation (11) in the text.   
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Figure 2: Natural rate shock
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Consume
r inflation
Output
Domestic
inflation
Governm
ent debt
Interest
rate 
 
Figure 3: Debt response to a cost shock under various parameters
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Figure 4: Debt response to a natural rate shock under various parameters
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Figure 5: Debt response to a government expenditure shock of varying persistence
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Figure 6: Change in debt and its components
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Figure 7: Interest, inflation and growth rates
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Table 1: Calibrations 
Baseline Calibrations   
Degree of price stickiness  0.75   
Price response to output  0.25  
Steady state real interest rate or natural interest rate  or i  0.01 
Variations in the natural interest rate due to temporary shocks rr  0.01 + 
Degree of openness  0.3  
Proportion of the R type  0.4 
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the R type R1  1  
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the P type P1  0 
Consumption of the P type Cp 0.2 
Consumption of the R type CR 1 
Share of backward looking inflation b 0.2 
Share of forward looking inflation f 0.8 
Response coefficient of taxes to the debt ratio b  0.15  
Response coefficient of taxes to G expenditure g  0 
Steady state public debt to output ratio b  0.8 
Monthly growth rate g  0.006 
Weight of output in the CB’s loss function qy   0.7 
Weight of inflation in the CB’s loss function q 2 
Weight of the interest rate in the CB’s loss function qi 1 
Implied parameters   
Weighted average elasticity of substitution 1/  0.58 
Discount factor  0.99 
Weighted average consumption level C 0.75 
Log deviation from world output  0.1 
Philips curve parameter  0.24 
Shocks    
Persistence of shock to G expenditure G 0.25 
Persistence of natural rate shock r 0.75 
Persistence of cost-push shock c 0 
Standard deviation of shock to G expenditure G
  0.1 
Standard deviation of natural rate shock r
  0.01 
Standard deviation of cost-push shock c
  0.2 
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Table 2: Simulations and volatilities 
Simulations Parameters Standard deviations of (in percentages): 
  
006.0,15.0,8.0  gb b  
Consumer 
inflation 
Output Domestic 
inflation 
Government 
debt (initial 
response) 
Interest rate 
(initial 
response) 
Cost shock Benchmark 0.58 0.36 1.08 0.48 (-
0.0174) 
0.70 (0.0256) 
 b=0.1 0.58 0.36 1.08 0.45 (-
0.0162) 
0.70 (0.0256) 
 g=0.008 0.58 0.36 1.08 0.47 (-
0.0169) 
0.70 (0.0256) 
 b =0.7 0.58 0.36 1.08 0.42 (-
0.0151) 
0.70 (0.0256) 
 q=1.1 0.71 0.18 1.21 0.16 (0.0056) 0.50 (0.0181) 
Natural rate 
shock    
Benchmark  0.47 0.16 0.31 6.18 (0.2088) 0.39 (-0.0133) 
 b =0.1 0.47 0.16 0.31 3.90 (0.1319) 0.39 (-0.0133) 
 b =0 0.47 0.16 0.31 2.20 (0.0745) 0.39 (-0.0133) 
 g= 0.004 0.47 0.16 0.31 5.36 (0.1813) 0.39 (-0.0133) 
 b =0.9 0.47 0.16 0.31 7.27 (0.2456) 0.39 (-0.0133) 
 q= 1.1 1.04 0.46 0.97 5.12 (0.1730) 0.83 (-0.0279) 
 qs=0.5, b=0 1.01 0.42 0.91 1.81 (0.0614) 0.82 (-0.0276) 
Gˆ  shock Persistence= 0.25  0.00 0.01 0.00 1.14             
(-0.0412) 
0.00 (0.0000) 
 Persistence =0.85, q = 1.1 80.07 14.40 42.38 251.63          
(-9.6890) 
37.48 (-
1.4167) 
 Persistence = 0.85 87.47 08.67 28.19 935.66          
(-3.5970) 
37.65 (-
0.1389) 
 Persistence = 0.85, b = 0 01.15 0.12 0.42 14.43             
(-0.5551) 
0.56 (-0.0204) 
 
